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1Figure 1 Private corporate investment (percent to GDP)


































1.1 The new Indian business cycle
In the India of old, good times and bad times were primarily about weather.
A good year was one with a good monsoon and vice versa. The business cycle
analysis in standard economics textbooks { involving an interplay of expec-
tations, inventories and private investment { did not substantially matter in
India. In addition, the domination of government in investment implied a
high stability of investment demand, since year-to-year 
uctuations in gov-
ernment investment do not take place based on forward-looking expectations.
In the following years, these features of the economy have changed dramat-
ically (Patnaik and Sharma, 2002; Shah, 2008). The share of agriculture
in GDP has dropped sharply from 40% to 17% in the three decades from
1979 to 2009. Alongside this decline of agriculture to 17%, there has been
a new rise of private corporate investment. Figure 1 shows the time-series
of private corporate investment, expressed as percent of GDP. All the way
till the early 1980s, this stayed below 5%. In this period, the 
uctuations in
corporate investment would have had little to do with overall macroeconomic
conditions.
After 1980, private corporate investment has achieved big values. It has also
been strongly linked to business cycle conditions. The two great expansions
in India { the mid 1990s and the post-2002 { were each associated with
very large expansions of private corporate investment. A change in private
2Figure 2 Volatility of GDP growth
























































corporate investment of as large as ten percentage points was observed in the
recent expansion.
Figure 2 turns to GDP volatility. Each point in this graph is the standard
deviation of the latest ten values for annual GDP growth. Vijay Kelkar
has emphasised that India's growth acceleration, from 1979 onwards, was
accompanied by a decline in GDP volatility (Kelkar, 2004, 2005). This is
clearly visible in the graph, where this standard deviation declined from
values such as three to four percentage points to values such as one to two
percentage points in the period after 1990. The rst point in the graph
(standard deviation over 1951{1961) was 2.71%. The last point in the graph
(standard deviation over 1999-2009) was 2.08%, showing a sharp decline of
63 basis points.
Prima facie, this would suggest that India does not have a big problem of
macroeconomic stabilisation. Both growth and stability got better, despite
no signicant change in macroeconomic policy institutions. However, the
cause of this decline in GDP growth volatility is primarily the decline in the
volatility of agriculture, the share of agriculture in GDP and the linkages
(covariances) between agriculture and other parts of the economy. Figure 2
also shows a dashed line which is the volatility of non-agriculture and non-
government GDP. This shows a broadly stable pattern from the early 1960s
onwards. The rst point in the graph (standard deviation over 1951{1961)
was 1.8%. The last point in the graph (standard deviation over 1999-2009)
was 1.96%: a worsening of 16 basis points.
The decline in volatility of overall GDP, despite the minimal extent of in-
3stitutional reform on macroeconomic policy, might make us complacent that
for reasons that we might not be able to fathom, macroeconomic volatility is
declining on its own. However, once agriculture and government is removed
from the picture, the story changes to one where the minimal extent of in-
stitutional reform on macroeconomic policy was (unsurprisingly) associated
with a slight worsening of GDP volatility.
1.2 The new problem of macroeconomic stabilisation
Macroeconomic stabilisation, or business cycles, have not been prominent
in Indian economic policy thinking in previous decades. However, several
arguments motivate a greater interest in these issues:
 Higher GDP volatility is likely to induce greater idiosyncratic variation of
individual stock returns. If capital controls or incomplete markets inhibit
full diversication and hedging of portfolios, then there is a possibility that
the cost of capital required for investing in India could be higher when GDP
volatility is higher. Through this, macroeconomic stabilisation could deliver
a reduced cost of capital and thus higher investment.
 Greater stability of consumption could directly improve welfare of citizens.1
The presence of nonlinearities such as bankruptcy costs { which are likely
to be bigger in a developing country { give another argument in favour of a
smoother trajectory for output.
 Whether economists think stabilisation is important or not, politicians in
a democracy are unlikely to stand aside when a downturn comes. As an
example, in 2007-2009, when the business cycle downturn came, politicians
in India tried to come out with impromptu responses. The choice that India
faces is not one of a framework for stabilisation versus the absence of such
a framework. The choice that India faces is one of stabilisation as hectic
crisis responses versus stabilisation as a well-planned framework, grounded
in law, and well understood and anticipated by the private sector.2
1However, this proposition needs to contend with the argument from Lucas (1987) that
these gains are small. In the standard modern dsge models, the bulk of the welfare gains
from stabilisation come from reducing price volatility. It is hard to reconcile this with the
strong interest of politicians in smoothing GDP 
uctuations.
2An analogy is found in the eld of deposit insurance, where it is said that democracies
are unable to cope with large bank failures. The choice, then, is not one between having or
not having deposit insurance. The choice is one of impromptu crisis response as opposed
to sophisticated institutional machinery that is grounded in transparency and law, and
fully understood by the private sector ahead of time thus reducing uncertainty.
4This is related to the rules versus discretion theme in economic policy analy-
sis (Barro and Gordon, 1983; Kydland and Prescott, 1977). While a govern-
ment might not promise to sharply enlarge the decit in a harsh downturn,
the market might know that in the absence of a well enforced scal rule, such
a decit enlargement is going to take place anyway. If a rules-based environ-
ment could be constructed, it would reduce uncertainty, improve responses
in a downturn through better planning as opposed to crisis-management,
and stabilise expectations.
In India, the framework of scal and monetary policy was established before
the business cycle 
uctuations of a market economy came about. In the new
setting, it is important to carefully design the legal and institutional frame-
works for scal and monetary policy so as to reduce the extent of business
cycle 
uctuations.3
A natural point of departure for such a discourse is the theoretical analy-
sis, and real-world experience with scal and monetary policy institutions
in oecd countries. In the last 30 years, a considerable body of work has
come together, which has guided a fundamental transformation of rules and
institutions (Chari and Kehoe, 2006; Taylor, 2005; Mishkin, 2007).
Erstwhile developing countries like Korea have graduated into oecd mem-
bership and are increasingly aligning their institutional architecture to the
best practices found amongst oecd countries. As India becomes more of a
open economy and a market economy, there is undoubtedly a lot to learn by
going along this path. At the same time, there are certain unique features
of India which are likely to be with us for a decade or two. These unique
features have a signicant in
uence on strategic thinking in India about the
monetary and scal policy frameworks that will be the most useful. The
remainder of this paper seeks to achieve a judicious blend of sound ideas
from theory and oecd practice, attenuated by the critical aspects where the
Indian reality suggests rst order modications.
3A more complete treatment would examine the mechanisms through which nancial
sector policy also induces procyclicality (or can be modied to reduce procyclicality. In
addition, there are intimate linkages between scal, nancial and monetary policy, as
examplied in the issues surrounding the establishment of the Debt Management Oce
(dmo) (Aziz, 2008). In this paper, we restrict ourselves to a treatment of scal and
monetary policy frameworks.
52 Stabilisation through monetary policy
2.1 The monetary policy transmission (or lack thereof)
In advanced economies, when the central bank changes the short-term inter-
est rate, the nancial system induces changes in a broad swathe of interest
rates in the economy, across a diverse array of maturity and credit quality.
Through this, changes in the short-term rate in
uence aggregate demand and
thus output and prices. In many countries, central banks use this capability
to stabilise the economy by focusing on achieving low and stable in
ation.
When the nancial system is weak, the monetary policy transmission is rela-
tively ineective. An illiquid and inecient bond market implies that changes
in the short rate do not transmit to a diverse array of interest rates. When
there is a lack of competition in the banking system, changes in the cost
of funds at the short end do not rapidly turn into changes in the cost of
borrowing from banks.
In an underdeveloped banking system, the magnitude of borrowing (ex-
pressed as percent of GDP) is small, so that changes in the policy rate have
a small impact upon borrowers. As an example, in India, `non food credit'
at the end of calendar 2009 stood at Rs.29 trillion, or roughly half of GDP.
When the nancial system is under-developed (Mistry, 2007; Rajan, 2008;
Patil, 2005; Thomas, 2006; Shah, Thomas, and Gorham, 2008), changes in
the policy rate do relatively little in terms of altering aggregate demand. In
other words, countries with a weak nancial system tend to have a feeble
monetary policy transmission.
The monetary policy transmission is critically about the capability of the
banking system and the bond market. These are areas where India is rela-
tively weak. As an example, the World Federation of Exchanges shows NSE
and BSE at 3rd and 5th rank in the world, by number of transactions. There
is no ranking of banking or bond market characteristics where India or an
Indian entity is in the top 25 in the world.
In terms of empirical evidence of the impact of short-term monetary condi-
tions upon the Index of Industrial Production or upon prices, Bhattacharya,
Patnaik, and Shah (2010) nd that after controlling for the exchange rate
channel, the null hypothesis of no-eect cannot be rejected. This is con-
sistent with the idea that the Indian bond market and banking system are
so highly undeveloped that, for all practical purposes, they do not deliver
a monetary policy transmission. Even if monetary policy in India desired a
6role in stabilisation, this is (at present) infeasible.
2.2 Implications of a large informal sector
The formal nancial system in India is relatively small. A substantial part
of the economy works through what is termed the `informal' nancial sys-
tem. This includes equity nancing from friends and family, borrowing from
moneylenders, indigenious methods of trade nancing, etc.
In recent years, there has been a considerable focus on the problem of `nan-
cial exclusion', which is dened as the class of individuals or rms who are
not part of the formal nancial system. Concerns about nancial exclusion
are primarily motivated by a sense that the lives of these individuals would
be improved if they could also connect to the formal nancial system.
For the present discussion, the persistence of a large informal sector in India
accentuates the ineectiveness of the monetary policy transmission. When
RBI raises the short-term interest rate, this can (at best) in
uence the price
charged by the banking system and the bond market to formal sector borrow-
ers. It is likely to have little impact upon the cost of capital in the informal
sector.
The focus on nancial inclusion has traditionally been motivated by the
agenda of poverty reduction. However, nancial inclusion, and the full inte-
gration between the formal nancial system and the world of informal nance,
should legitimately be a part of the policy agenda for building an eective
monetary policy transmission. Recent innovations in nancial engineering
connected with informal nance, such as linking up micro nance institutions
to the wholesale bond market through securitisation, would help improve in-
tegration between formal nance and informal nance, and thus help further
this agenda of creating a meaningful monetary policy transmission.
2.3 Exchange rate 
exibility : a tool for stabilisation
As argued above, in countries where nancial sector reforms have made little
progress, we get problems such as a weak bond market and banking system,
low levels of private debt to GDP, and a large informal nancial system which
is poorly integrated into formal nance. This generates a weak monetary
policy transmission.
7In many countries aicted with weaknesses in nancial sector reform, how-
ever, the process of trade reform has made considerable headway. When
goods arbitrage takes place, `exchange rate pass-through' is observed, where

uctuations in the exchange rate in
uence local prices.
This yields a channel for in
uence for monetary policy. Changes in the policy
rate in
uence the exchange rate (though de facto capital account openness),
and thus in
uence prices. Raising interest rates would lead to capital coming
into the country, which would lead to an exchange rate appreciation, and thus
lower domestic prices. Even though changes in the policy rate may have a
limited impact upon aggregate demand, changes in the policy rate could be
a useful tool for targeting in
ation, through the impact upon the exchange
rate and thence the exchange-rate pass-through.
When capital 
ows come into the country, on one hand it is expansionary
since this is generally associated with increased investment demand. But
at the same time, with a 
exible exchange rate regime, an exchange rate
appreciation would be obtained. This would reduce protability and thus
investment demand in the tradeables sector. While the empirical magnitudes
need to be determined, there is an element of stabilisation that is inbuilt,
when shocks to capital 
ows are allowed to in
uence the exchange rate.
The exchange rate is the only monetary tool for stabilisation where signif-
icant eects are empirically visible in India today. A proper conguration
of monetary policy in India should hence involve exchange rate appreciation
in good times. When times are good, capital 
ows (which tend to be pro-
cyclical) would come into the country; the exchange rate would appreciate;
this would crimp the protability and thus investment demand of the trade-
ables sector. When times are bad, capital 
ows would leave the country;
the exchange rate would depreciate; thus augmenting the protability and
investment demand of the tradeables sector.
Volatility of the exchange rate (and stability of reserves) is the path to stabil-
isation of the business cycle. Conversely, instability of reserves and a stable
exchange rate generate enhanced business cycle 
uctuations. The idea that
the central bank should buy reserves at a time of increased capital in
ows
(and thus achieve an invariant exchange rate) is synonymous with giving up
the only tool for stabilisation { the exchange rate { which the central bank
in India possesses (Patnaik, 2005).
These insights put a new perspective on the evolution of monetary policy in
India. In a closed economy with a xed exchange rate, and without a sophis-
ticated nancial system, monetary policy is largely ineective. It is ironic
8that RBI's eorts, in preventing a capable bond market and banking system
from coming about, have implied that RBI as a central bank is relatively
ineective. Exchange rate 
exibility and capital account openness gives a
rst avenue through which stabilisation can take place.
2.4 Short term strategy
In the short term, the long-standing weaknesses of nancial sector policy
cannot be changed. In the short run, the bond market cannot be brought to
life; an ecient and competitive banking system cannot come about.
Hence, in the short term, the only tool for stabilisation is the exchange rate
coupled with an open capital account. Capital 
ows are inherently pro-
cyclical. In good times, money would come into the country, the exchange
rate would appreciate, in
ation would be curtailed, protability and thus
investment demand of the tradeables sector would be crimped. All these
things would operate in reverse in recessions.
The traditional monetary policy transmission requires sophisticated institution-
building: on nancial sector policy and on monetary policy. In contrast, ex-
change rate 
exibility only requires inaction on the part of the central bank.
It does not require a sophisticated institutional machinery in order to deliver
useful stabilisation.
2.5 Medium-term strategy
In the medium term, the long-standing weaknesses of the nancial system
can and should be addressed. This involves attacking the problems of the
bond market, the banking system and nancial inclusion. The technical
roadmap for this has been dened by a series of committee reports (Mistry,
2007; Rajan, 2008; Patil, 2005; Aziz, 2008).
Once a monetary policy transmission has been achieved, a strong monetary
policy process is also required, based on the key principles of independence,
accountability and transparency. Through this, changes in the short-term
interest rate would be an important tool for stabilisation of the economy.
This can, however, only happen in the medium term, since it requires a
sophisticated nancial system and a new RBI Act.
93 Stabilisation through scal policy
3.1 Generic diculties of discretionary scal policy
From the 1960s onwards, the use of discretionary scal policy in business cycle
stabilisation has come under increasing criticism. Two major constraints that
have been identied are: speed and politicisation.
In the NBER data for US business cycles, in the 10 downturns from 1945 to
2001, the average recession lasted 10 months. This short duration is hard to
reconcile with the real world delays of scal policy. For discretionary scal
policy to come into play, the following delays are encountered:
1. The rst delay is the time taken for the statistical system to discern a re-
cession. As an example, we now know that the three month moving average
growth of seasonally adjusted IIP peaked (at 20%) in late 2006.4 But till the
end of 2007, most analysts had not understood that IIP growth had peaked
in the previous year.5
2. Substantial responses by the government { e.g. an expansion of the decit by
more than 0.5% of GDP { can only happen through a budget. This generally
induces a delay between the date that a downturn is seen and the date of the
budget. Conversely, in February, when a budget is being formed (and when
data about the previous December has not yet come in), relatively little is
known about business cycle conditions in the year that is to start from the
coming April.
3. Large changes in a budget made in February typically do not generate mod-
ied expenditures until June.
Hence, under ideal conditions and assuming no mistakes are made, a down-
turn in September would be clearly visible by February; it would induce a
response on the part of discretionary scal policy which would hit the econ-
omy by the coming June. This is a delay of nine months. This shortest delay
is possible for a recession that begins in September. For all other starting
dates of a recession, the delay for discretionary scal policy would be larger.
If, as in the US, recessions are a year long (on average), then these delays
make discretionary scal policy ill-suited for the task of stabilisation.
4Source: http://www.mayin.org/cycle.in
5This problem is not unique to India. As an example from the US, the NBER dating
committee made the announcement that December 2007 had been a peak in December
2008, i.e. a full year later.
10The second problem with discretionary scal policy is its politicisation. Prior
to an election, it is likely that politicians will favour expansionary scal policy,
thus inducing election cycles exactly as is the case with central banks that
lack independence. Further, the design of taxation or expenditure programs
as part of a scal stimulus, in a crisis environment, can lead to favours being
given out to marginal constituencies.6
The research literature has shown sombre empirical results about discre-
tionary scal policy. It is found that GDP volatility is higher in countries
where there is more discretion in scal policy. Countries which put more con-
straints on scal policy fare better. Further, these eects are stronger with
poor countries. These conceptual arguments and evidence suggest that India
should avoid utilising discretionary scal policy responses to a downturn.
3.2 Unique Indian features of discretionary scal pol-
icy
These arguments, about the delays and politicisation of scal policy, and
thus the optimality of avoiding discretionary scal policy, have been widely
accepted worldwide. When we think about India, there are some unique
features of the Indian economy which need to be taken into account.
India has an unhappy history of chronic scal indiscipline. In the 31 years
from 1979-80 onwards, the median value for the gross scal decit of the
Centre was 6.26% of GDP. Large primary surpluses are the hallmark of a
period where a country achieves scal consolidation. It is only in the brief
period from 2003-04 till 2007-08 that India ran small primary surpluses. The
overall picture is one where the median primary surplus was -2.19%. Owing
to this failure to achieve primary surpluses, in these three decades, India has
never had a period where the debt/GDP was paid down signicantly, in the
fashion seen in many other countries.
In the period after 1990-91, the median value of the central government's
debt/GDP ratio was 57.13 and the latest value (for 2009-10) was 63.83%.
6Other consequences of the use of discretionary scal policy include an increase in
uncertainty for the private sector. The ideal tax system is one in which there is long-term
stability of tax rates. Once major reforms of the tax system are nished, and India is on
a framework that emphasises the personal income tax and the GST, the aim should be
to have atmost one change to one of these rates per decade. This stability will assist the
ability of the private sector to undertake long-term planning in condence. Year to year

uctuations in tax rates damage plans of the private sector.
11This is a worrisome level of indebtedness, when we consider that govern-
ment debt was below 60 per cent of GDP in most episodes of default by
governments in emerging economies in recent years (Reinhart, Rogo, and
Savastano, 2003).
In this setting, of scal fragility as the normal condition, suppose discre-
tionary scal policy is used to achieve stabilisation when a downturn comes
along. This has important negative ramications. Fiscal fragility is wors-
ened, which exacerbates the downturn in various ways. As an example, the
cost of borrowing of private rms abroad goes up in a downturn since the
credit rating of the sovereign gets downgraded.
Indian-style chronic scal distress thus involves a new channel for procyclical-
ity through increased scal fragility when discretionary scal policy is used
in a downturn.
3.3 Procyclicality of the scal balance in India
The other channel for scal procyclicality lies in the budget constraints faced
by the government. When a country has weak scal institutions, and decits
and debt have reached uncomfortable levels, in bad times or in normal times,
nance ministers are cautious about spending. In booms, the pressure of
decits and debt appears to be alleviated owing to automatic stabilisers (the
response of tax revenues to good times, and the smaller expenses that some
existing programs incur in good times). In such times, nance ministers feel
comfortable about the scal situation, and governments embark on enlarge-
ment of spending programs.
Conversely, when there is a business cycle downturn, decits and debt achieve
uncomfortable values, and governments embark on austerity drive.
Such behaviour yields pro-cyclical scal policy. When times are good, gov-
ernment expenditure makes them better. When times are bad, government
tightens its belt, making things worse.
Figure 3 illustrates this problem in India's central government nances. It
shows that on average, the growth in expenditure in 2010-11 is likely to
be bigger by 0.3786 percentage points for each percentage point of growth
in gross tax revenues in 2009-10 (and vice versa). A government making
a budget in January and February is likely to spend more in the coming
year when growth in gross tax revenues in the current year has been better
12Figure 3 Central government spends more in year t when gross tax revenues
grew well in year t   1
The x axis of this graph shows the growth in gross taxes in the year (in percent), using data
from 1980 onwards. The y axis shows the growth in non-interest expenditures (in percent)
of the central government in the next year. It highlights the idea that in February 2010,
when a budget is being prepared, a strong performance on gross tax revenues in 2009-10
generates a bigger bias in favour of expansion of expenditure for 2010-11.
The coecient of the regression line is 0.3786 (with a t statistic of 1.983). On average,
a 1 percentage point improvement in gross tax revenue growth in year t yields bigger




























































































13(and vice versa). Through this, government spends more when business cycle
conditions are buoyant and vice versa, inducing pro-cyclicality.
The other dimension of scal policy and stabilisation pertains to rare and
catastrophic events. When a country has healthy values for debt and decits
under ordinary times, this creates the space through which the rare use of dis-
cretionary scal policy can help the economy in rare and extreme events. The
deeper consequence of this scal space is that the private sector feels more
condent in the outlook for the country, knowing that the State has the ca-
pability to marshall remarkable responses when extreme situations arise once
or twice a century. This condence induces bigger investments in nancial
and human capital.
3.4 Looking forward
In this dicult situation, how can India's scal policy framework best cater
to stabilisation? The three key ideas appear to be:
1. Fiscal consolidation needs to be the rst area of focus. The channels of
procyclicality described above are critically related to scal fragility. India
needs to cap the consolidated debt/GDP ratio (of centre and states) at 60%,
and credibly ensure that it will not rise above 60% even in a sharp downturn.
2. Discretionary scal policy induces many problems. In terms of scal pol-
icy, the sensible path would involve expansion of programs such as nreg,
which are automatic stabilisers. That is, they yield bigger decits in bad
times and smaller decits in good times, without discretionary action by the
government. The scal space for these programs can be made by shrinking
expenditures of the government which yield little by way of public goods
such as subsidies, and existing programs on health and education.
As with the analysis of informal nance above, this emphasis on the safety
net (through programs such as nreg) is another area where the poverty
alleviation agenda is consistent with institution building for India as a ma-
ture market economy. While the nreg is desirable from the viewpoint of
poverty alleviation, it is also desirable from the viewpoint of business cycle
stabilisation through non-discretionary scal policy.
3. Progress on monetary policy reform will yield a new mechanism of stabili-
sation, which will reduce the pressure upon politicians to engage in discre-
tionary scal policy when faced with a downturn.
144 Economic reforms as a tool for stabilisation
Economists generally think in terms of counteracting business cycle 
uctua-
tions using scal policy and monetary policy. But in India, both scal policy
and monetary policy institutions are relatively feeble. They do not have the
capability to make a substantial dierence if the challenge that is posed to
them is counteracting a decline in private corporate investment of 10% of
GDP or Rs.550,000 crore a year.
In coming years, India must build up high quality scal, nancial and mon-
etary policy institutions. These institutions will give the institutional ca-
pability through which stabilisation can be done. This is a desirable goal,
and should be undertaken. In the short term, when faced with a storm,
the institutional capabilities required for stabilisation are largely absent. If
the challenge is a potential decline of investment by Rs.550,000 crore a year,
scal policy and monetary policy are mere spectators.
In a downturn, the private sector tends to be concerned about the outlook
for Indian GDP growth. The private sector needs to be persuaded that India
is serious about economic policy reform, so as to get back to an optimistic
environment where India is on the move, growth expectations are strong, and
investment gets going again.
The will to invest of the private sector is thus shaped by `animal spirits' of
private corporations. Accelerating broad-based economic reforms is an im-
portant tool for stabilisation. In a downturn, it can induce greater optimism
about India, and yield increased private corporate investment. The magni-
tudes involved here are larger than those which can be mustered through
monetary or scal policy.
5 Conclusion
Drawing together the key ideas of this paper, the policy directions emphasised
in this paper, in order to achieve macroeconomic stabilisation in India, may
be summarised as follows:
 Fiscal consolidation needs to be the rst area of focus. The channels
of procyclicality described in the paper are critically related to scal
fragility. India needs to cap the consolidated debt/GDP ratio (of centre
and states) at 60%, and credibly ensure that it will not rise above 60%
even in a sharp downturn.
15 Discretionary scal policy induces many problems. In terms of scal
policy, the sensible path would involve expansion of programs such
as nreg, which are automatic stabilisers. That is, they yield bigger
decits in bad times and smaller decits in good times, without discre-
tionary action by the government. The scal space for these programs
can be made by shrinking expenditures of the government which yield
little by way of public goods such as subsidies, and existing programs
on health and education.
 Progress on monetary policy reform will yield a new mechanism of
stabilisation, which will reduce the pressure upon politicians to engage
in discretionary scal policy when faced with a downturn.
 In the short term, business cycle stabilisation through the short-term
interest rate is largely ineectual, owing to shortcomings of both nan-
cial sector policy and monetary policy.
 In the short term, exchange rate 
exibility is a tool through which
stabilisation can be obtained. A rupee appreciation reduces in
ation,
reduces prots of the tradeables sector and thus the investment de-
mand of the tradeables sector. Through this, a rupee appreciation is
contractionary (and vice versa).
 In the medium term, the implementation of the four major committee
reports on nancial sector reforms will yield a nancial system with a
meaningful monetary policy transmission. This would need to be ac-
companied by commensurate reform of monetary policy arrangements.
 In the short term, structural economic reform is a tool for stoking
investment demand in a downturn, by increasing optimism about India.
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